Interview with Leroy Luberg (excerpt - Tape 2)

LeRoy Luberg #66 Transcript LL: . . . presented to them from Faculty-Student Life and Interest Committee for united in the feeling that there were, no regulations would be violated if this meeting was held on campus, the Free Cuba group. So they did. We were also alerted by our campus police, protection security, that there might be a major protest on the part of fraternities and sororities, particularly the fraternities. We said in spite of that, it ought to go on. Well, there was the protest, and just as the meeting was getting underway on the steps of the Union, probably about 400 or 500 there, there was a, a big influx of students from Langdon Street, from the fraternities, oh, I would think 400 or 500, calling out insults and heckling these students that were proposing the Free Cuba enterprise. Right or wrong, I suggested that rather than have it in the open, we have it in the Union Theater. DT: You suggested this on the spot? LL: On the spot, to Porter [Butts?], and he said, yes, he said, if you will be responsible. And so I allowed them to go in. And they did go into the theater and then I asked the president of the student government to take over because I didn't think that a dean of students should be there moderating and suggested that there be five minutes for one position and five minutes for the opposition, and that they go on and have about six total speakers, three on one side, three on another, and then that the moderator allow written questions to come from the crowd. And that all of [words unclear] will know. They held pretty well to that, uh, recommendation, but the stirrings were there of the liberal students and the conservative students and moving in to a national issue. You could feel that this was something that was going to continue. There was, there was a noisy session, yet, it was, I think, fairly useful, covered quite fairly by the media. But when it was over, there were several of us who were there, and since I was immediately responsible, I told Porter Butts that I don't think we, I didn't think we should ever try to do it quite that way again. Uh, if we're going to have a session like that, we need to be very carefully structured. We needed to know exactly who was going to speak or how it was going to be handled. We didn't have to know who was going to speak, but we had to have a format. And I doubted if we could just go in as a big mob like I allowed them to, to go into the Union Theater because anything could've happened there. Fortunately, we came out of it quite well. But the stirring was there. You could feel the tensions. You could feel the anger. You could feel the bitterness, and you could also sense the ignorance. A lot of people were talking about Cuba didn't know what the issues were. And a lot of people were talking about communism and didn't know what the issues were. But the seeds were there for the protests and the riots that came up on different topics, mostly the military in just, oh, two to three years later they started. DT: Do you feel that this, in a sense, this was sort of the beginning of -- LL: I felt it was the beginning. There may have been other things, but I think the Free Cuba discussion and the near violence, the anger, the bitterness, and the sharp division of the group, uh, represented the beginning of the riots and protests that reached their peak in 1970. DT: Well, perhaps we ought to go on and talk a little bit about the riots and the protests -- LL: Yes. DT: And the sit-ins, uh, that took place in the mid-'60s. LL: Well, there was the, back again, the fraternities. It seems rather peaceful now, but they decided to march. They decided to march in the defense of the Delta Gamma group. So fraternities and sororities on a very rainy day, uh, marched all the length of Langdon Street. There must have been 1,000 of them, very orderly, but very serious and brought a proclamation to the front of Bascom Hall, which I received, the proclamation being that we at the University shall allow Delta Gamma to continue even if the national charter was unchanged, that the local group were free, they were open, they were nondiscriminatory, and we at the University should be strong enough and broadminded enough to allow them to continue. But this was one of the first marches of the kind. Later, of course, they got rough, and they got very difficult to handle and became really mobs. This was orderly. But again, you could feel, this was about 1960, '61, you could feel the mood mellow of marching and taking action. If letters to the editor and art, and editorials wouldn't do, then do something else. Marching was [words unclear]. There was also, um, the protests about ROTC on the campus in about 1961. This was very sharp. There was a meeting on the lower campus in front of the library, and President Elvehjem was invited to come down to speak to the group about why we should continue ROTC on campus. There were speakers there who protested ROTC, that it was outmoded, that no part of a University life. It taught only the militarism. It brought death, brought destruction, it was something of the past, that we should be ashamed of, the whole military effort. And ROTC was a symbol of that blasphemous military war effort. Uh, President Elvehjem did not choose to go. He rather had me read his statement. And I did read the statement, in which he defended not only the right of the University to have ROTC but pointed out that we were compelled to have it as a Land Grant University, at least to offer it. This was not received very well, of course, by those who were there to protest. The people there were not for ROTC. They were against it. But again, with the roar of that crowd, that was not like one of those violent ones in 1965, '67, '68. But again, you could feel the development of a protest spirit that was not going to be put down just by a statement, even by the president of the University. DT: So you feel it all began as early as that? LL: Yes, um-hmm. I felt it was beginning then in 1960-61. So you had, uh, the request for more freedom in the housing, the more freedom of speech on the part of students, the breaking down of the requirements of a national charter for fraternities and sororities, and then students folding into international affairs and then questioning ROTC. All of these things together indicated that there was something moving, that it wasn't going to stop in a day or two. You could feel that the structure was being built for a major conflict. And we had it. DT: Well, I was going to say, we know what happened. Would you talk about what, what did in fact develop? LL: The first, uh, real difficulty was about 1965. This was growing all the while. DT: Was this the Dow Chemical protest. LL: And the Dow, Dow Chemical protest, when students protested the Dow Chemical people being on the campus -- DT: So recruiting? LL: To recruit, to recruit students for a service with the Dow Chemical, because the Dow Chemical was making napalm, I don't know how we pronounce it now. The crowd said napalm then, which burned and disfigured children and civilians as well as the military in Vietnam. They requested that a group of students, so-called liberals, not necessarily, but those, I think we, that the term is unfortunate. I think we just have to say protesters, requested the chancellor, then Bob Fleming, to deny Dow Chemical the right to be on campus. And in that request, and in their protest, they took over the chancellor's office. This is pretty well documented by a lot of the press at the time. DT: This is the sort of thing that's sitting. LL: That's right, and they did. They just came in, and they did sit in. Uh, I think that Chancellor Fleming handled it very well. I don't know if he'd do it the same way again. But he negotiated with them. And he did have a degree of rapport with them. He seemed to understand what they were after, and I think he surprised them often by anticipating what they were going to say and anticipating their point of view. He too was against the Vietnam efforts, the Dow efforts in Vietnam. He too felt that it was a mistake and said so. So he aligned himself, himself with them on that score. But he did say that the University work had to go on, and he said that they could not take over, and he did call for protection and security to assist him. There were arrests. There was some roughness. But I don't think over 200 students were involved. So here on this big campus, we still had just a relative handful of students involved. But again, it was a symbol. It was a representation. It was a breaking through for the more violent things that were to come. DT: Well, as I recall, not only was it a sit-in, but also, there was something called a teach-in, something -- LL: Yes, um-hmm. DT: Certain number of the faculty were involved in those. LL: Uh-hmm, well, now the faculty, that's a good point because the faculty became more and more involved. The faculty became not only interested in what the students have to say, but they begin to attend the sessions. And the students wanted a sit-in, uh, a teach-in where the teachers would volunteer their time to discuss Vietnam, the role of the United States in Vietnam. And these teach-ins were very well attended. And some of them went all night. Actually, my opinion is that they released a lot of the tensions. Students wanted something to do, like the first marches that were, just by the fraternities and sororities, very peaceful and decorous. But now you've got up into 1965 and '66, and they wanted something in which they could really belong. And so they could possibly make a little sacrifice. And at this time too, there came along with the teach-ins, the marches to the capitol. There were meetings at the field house, and then there were torchlight parades or candlelight parades, not torchlights, candlelight peace parades to the capitol. Some of them got out of hand a bit, but not bad. So again, there was movement, marching, marching, and the numbers would grow and grow as they got up to the capitol and came back. And, of course, there were those that clearly looked for the police to make a mistake. As soon as the police billy clubs came out, that's just what was looked for. Then they could point out that they were being martyrs, they were sacrificing and that the police brutality is a part of the horrible establishment. The national defense, the military, and the police all in, in league against the freedom of human beings, especially those that wanted to defend the poor children and the old of Vietnam. It came about, about them, and then in 1967, came the kind of protest that all of us worried about. I was among them that worried about what would happen if there was a taking over of a building by a major group, and if the police moved in and began to swing the clubs. I was afraid too that since police have pistols on their hips, that there could be firing, that there could be someone killed or seriously wounded. DT: Well, what kind of relation did the University administration have with the Madison police? I mean, there is the University protection and security, right? LL: Yes. DT: Under what conditions would the Madison police or the National Guard or what have you have been summoned? LL: The [word unclear], the police and the, uh, Dane County, city police and Dane County, the sheriffs were called in only when protection and security felt that they could not manage the situation. Protection and security were there first. And we had a, still have a quite remarkable fellow, Ralph Hanson, who became something of a folk hero as director of Protection and Security for the Madison campus. He was very low key, courageous, walked right into the crowd. He was friendly, was humorous, but firm. He was able to stand heckling. He was able to develop rapport with the leaders. He got respect from the crowd. In fact, they all called him Ralph, and at the end, rather affectionately because he was dignified, friendly, uh, open, direct. They knew he had a job to do, but he did it with decency and with a [word unclear] sense of humor. A big fellow physically, clearly unafraid, and he was never touched, but much respected. I think he did a lot to keep these things in hand. But he and his small staff, when faced with the hundreds and hundreds who were angry, belligerent, he couldn't very well control. So then, he had to call in the Madison police and occasionally, the sheriffs, and finally, the National Guard. And the major so-called blowup was in 1967 in October, when there was the protest about the Dow Chemical and students, mostly students, there were some non-students, took over the School of Business, where they were interviewing. And, uh, because of the mobs there, because they stopped movement of the students into the building and the faculty, and the police were called, and then there were, it was very tense. [Words unclear] know that it was crackling with danger. The air was electric, and as you watched it, you just wished that somehow the crowd could be dispersed because, sure enough, some shoving took place. I don't know who was really wrong, but then the clubs came out, and then the tear gas was thrown. DT: Was this the first occasion when tear gas was used on the campus? LL: Yes, I think this was the very first occasion for tear gas in October, '67. So to see bloody heads and tear gas and the roar and screams of a crowd was not only disturbing, but it was the kind of thing that haunted you for a while. DT: Now what was your role in this? LL: Very little. I stayed out of it. I was now a University dean for Public Services, which is a whole new field. I worked with research. I worked with applying, helping to apply research on campus, fundamental and all to business, industry, to government, and I also represented the president and the regents at meetings around the state and worked with the Board of Visitors. I worked with overseas developments. I was in the whole new sphere. DT: No longer is directly involved with students? LL: No, I was not involved with students at all. As a matter of fact, I made it a point not to be involved. We have a new dean of students, Joe Kauffman, who's doing a good job and inherited, walked into a very tough situation and in fact an almost impossible situation with all of these forces coming together. I did observe. I wanted to see some of it. I stayed far enough away so that some of them who knew me as the dean of students wouldn't be referring to me. But I did want to observe so that when I had the meetings around the state, I could say that I was there, and this was what I observed firsthand. And I also wanted to observe so that if the president and others wanted some consultation, if they did, I could do it on a basis of seeing what had happened. DT: What kind of reaction around the state did you meet? LL: Oh, most unfortunate and bitter, feeling that the University was getting out of hand, that these people who were here were probably students that were making this kind of a protest and this kind of a riot were anti-American and against the institutions that they revered. That many felt that they should just be expelled. Now when I say many, I should not say a majority. For there were some polls taken at that time, attitudes toward the University, and still over 60% of the Wisconsin people according to [Len Sharp?], Professor Sharp's surveys had confidence in the University and in the administration, that in spite of difficulties, things were being handled about as well as they could. But about 30% felt that administration was in error, the faculty was in error, and the students were, and that this was a, not only a bad mark on the part of the University, but probably something we would never recover from. That was about 30%. I think it would be interesting to look those figures up again, Dr. Sharp DT: That sounds -- yes, it would. LL: Yes, he made a survey. But a significant thing was 55% to 60% said, well, this is happening in other places too, at Yale and Harvard and Chicago, California, Berkeley, and the University of Wisconsin is one of the kinds of places that these extremists would go to get attention. And they said that, uh, this will pass, and we're against this fighting in Vietnam too, and it's well that the students do have a protest. They're unwise in the way they're doing it, but you can't blame them for kicking. That was a lot of the response. But significantly, 55% to 60% said that all in all, things were being handled in good shape. But you heard a lot about that 30%. DT: Yeah, I suppose. Well, and it didn't stop there either. LL: No, then it went on. Could we pick it up another time now? [Slight pause.] The facts are, of course -- DT: The facts of -- LL: -- as revealed, in the memo concerning the egg-throwing incident, that three students were certainly involved. Actually, they were apprehended, they were brought before the disciplinary committee, they admitted their guilt, and action was therefore to be taken. Now that I have the memos and letters before me, I do recall the supplementary facts concerning this case of 1956. Governor Rennebohm, former Governor Rennebohm, then on the board of regents, and John D. Jones, also on the board of regents, were most upset about this incident. They felt that it was something that should not be treated in the usual fashion of student misconduct. It was their opinion that it needed, demanded, the attention of the board of regents. Consequently, the board did give it attention at an executive session. And when it was over, it was agreed that special attention to this whole matter be given by the office of the president. After that decision, President Fred asked me, since I was then serving as his assistant, to follow this matter personally. And I did. While President Fred was in Virginia during a few days in June, it seemed best, because of some communications by phone and some follow-ups of letters to the editor and all, that we see Governor, former Governor Rennebohm personally. That was done. Professor [Ihde?], who was chairman of the Student Conduct and Appeals Committee, joined me. We did see Oscar Rennebohm, and he was most upset about the whole matter and wanted to be sure that we, that several things happened. One, that the boys were given firm discipline, two, that somebody followed up on their progress in making amends, and that, three, a report come back on what had happened to him, to John Jones, and if need be, to the board of regents. His concern was that such a serious matter could just get lost in the shuffle of many other activities duties, and responsibilities. And he maintained that it should be given a top priority and that someone should be designated to follow through. It turns out that Professor Ihde and I both proposed that, we too proposed that there be someone designated and Oscar Rennebohm said that it would be all right with him if I, as assistant to the president, making sure that the president of the University was well informed of everything going on, would be the one who would give it personal attention and would have the boys report to me. It was also his wish that we communicate directly with John D Jones to let him know what was to be done. The report then was made, specifying that the boys, upon recommendation of the appeals committee would do some actual work, not be given the money, an amount of $200, to pay as a penalty, but that they would do some work for a commercial firm or a farmer or someone where they would surely be required to check in and check out and put in a full day's work, the more difficult the job, the better. So they did agree, the committee agreed. And the boys were informed of this. They did do the work. They did various jobs. They reported then to me, and they also made their payments as rapidly as they could. DT: Did you say it was $200? LL: $200. They paid in varying amounts. Finally, in early 1957, the boys had not only had good records, stayed out of trouble, but had made their payments, and their payments were made with funds which they had earned by doing manual work and other duties. They also consulted with me. They came in to see me, and I made sure that their record was good, checking with their advisors and with campus protection and security to be certain that as far as we knew, there had been no other episodes. It all ended with satisfaction. In order to go on to the Law School, Mr. [Krinker?] did have some difficulty because he was on probation, disciplinary probation. He had to be cleared from that. He also wanted to get some work done at UWM, and that was a bit difficult to get there with, without having the probation follow him. We did see that he was cleared of that probation before he left. I had never heard of these fellows after that, or I went to the governor's office in January of 1957, and a man who replaced me, Mr. William Thomas, followed up on the final details. Perhaps the essential part of this is that a governing board was incensed, even angry at having students or anyone else, in this case students, throwing eggs at officers and men in uniform, who are parading on an Armed Forces Day. The regents felt this was insulting, and that if something was not done, that these young men were not disciplined, and if there wasn't a careful follow-up, we could have a very dangerous trend of disrespect for the flag, for the uniform, and for the federal government. DT: I suppose it wasn't too good for the University's image either. LL: No, no, and, uh, we did have editorials. We did have headlines. There was much concern around the state, letters to the editor. But there were, there was not much concern on the part of the faculty. The Conduct and Appeals Committee, Professor Ihde and his group, principally wanted to get the matter over. They, uh, understood the regents' concern, but they felt it was a mistake, and they did point out, as I recall now, after the hearings were over with these students, that we did have the engineering parades, and that eggs were thrown. And it was considered something of a lark. And in fact, everyone looked with amusement at the engineers throwing eggs at the law students in retaliation for the eggs that the law students had thrown at them in the first place. So the faculty and students didn't feel it was a matter of top priority. But the regents did. And Dr. Fred responded, and he felt that they should receive attention of the president's office. So this was a most unusual procedure. DT: What would they -- LL: Very, very rarely was a conduct case taken out of the hands, which in this case, it really was. DT: Of the committee? LL: Of the Committee on Conduct and Appeals, and referred to the president's office. Uh, we did, in keeping with Dr. Fred's policies, do our utmost to keep in touch with the Conduct and Appeals, so we didn't have a schism there and didn't have some demarcation of president's office, administration, versus the faculty committee. But we did keep in touch with Professor Ihde. And now, as I recall, while I was delegated to go to see Oscar Rennebohm, representing the president to confer about this matter, I asked Oscar if it wouldn't be all right for me to bring the chairman of the Conduct and Appeals Committee with me. And he agreed. Of course, this was well after the event, a couple months after the event, and I remember too that Professor Ihde handled the matter very, very successfully. He was low-key. He was patient. He agreed that it was a most unfortunate thing. He said we must not allow it to happen again, and he wanted to be sure on behalf of the committee that these young men were given proper penalties, that this would be something that they would never forget as long as they lived and when Professor Ihde, in his dignified, careful fashion was through, Oscar Rennebohm said, well, I think that you fellows are going to handle this just right. But then he gave us one more blast about just too much liberalism and too much disrespect for the flag, and after that was over, we went to the business of working out the procedure. Another sidelight on this is that in 1950, 1949, at the annual review of the ROTC, uh, it was either 1949 or 1950, when we had a great number of young men in ROTC, because it was required, a group paraded around Camp Randall Stadium, in fact, inside, protesting ROTC, protesting the military. And Oscar Rennebohm, then governor, was there. And he was bitter and angry about this demonstration, the kind of things we take in stride now. But in 1949, shortly after World War II, when patriotism of that kind was very high, Oscar Rennebohm spoke vigorously about it and was most unhappy and said so to everyone who would listen. I think this was 1950. It turned out that just about a day later, we had the Reserve Officers Association, meeting in Madison, the state meeting. And I was the presiding officer. And Oscar Rennebohm was there. And I recall that he got up at that meeting and condemned the action that happened out at Camp Randall. DT: The protest? LL: The protest, and got great applause from the Army officers who were there assembled. So this 1956 episode fitted in a bit with the episode of 1950. DT: He was certainly consistent. LL: Yeah. DT: Was, was the kind of, the form of the discipline that was decided on, uh, unlike what -- LL: Most unusual. DT: -- happened, was usually done? LL: Most unusual, um, for students to be required to do a given amount of work, specified work, to earn the money was unusual. It was a little bit the kind of thing that you might have done in grade school or high school now as we look back. I don't think you could, we'd possibly do it in 1974. But in 1956, it was possible to do it. So this was unusual first, that students would be required to make a payment to a scholarship -- DT: Oh, is that where it went? LL: That's right, to a student scholarship, the scholarship, I don't remember, but it was to assist other students. And secondly, that the payment would come, not from a father's purse, but from hard work, which would be identified as [word unclear] and during the summer session or the time when they normally wouldn't be in classes. And further unusual that students would be reporting not to a dean of men or to a dean of women, but would be reporting to the office of president of the University, and further that there would be a direct communication to the governing board, the board of regents. So it was very, very different. Actually, if you took all of the disciplinary cases and had them all handled that way, you'd have to have a whole corps or staff for the president to do that work, and the regents would be spending a major share of their time hearing conduct cases. And that would be unwise in many respects because you'd be interfering with faculty rights and students' rights and privileges. You would also be having the administration reaching down into faculty-student affairs unwisely. And in addition, there was a competent staff of counselors, advisors, faculty committee on student conduct and appeals that was all equipped to do exactly that kind of thing. So one episode could be handled without undue interference. But if we'd had two or three more, there might have been a real shakedown to decide, well, really, who is running this kind of thing for the University? Now I recall too that I did meet with President Fred and with Ira Baldwin. And Ira Baldwin was then vice president of the University. And we all agreed that since I was designated, that I would follow up. But we would keep it all as low-key as possible. All three of us were pleased that it, we'd come out of it as well as we had. DT: That's very interesting. LL: Uh-hmm. Yeah, yeah, I remember the '51, for the 1949 or 1950 one so very well because I was presiding at the time. DT: Well, perhaps now, we might continue with, with the, well, I guess we were talking about the, the beginnings of the really, uh, serious protest movements at the University. LL: Yes, we were. That's right. DT: And you talked about the Dow incident. But, uh, as being a beginning of, well, first time tear gas was used and so forth. Um, I was wondering -- LL: That was 1967, October. DT: I was wondering what your opinion was of the way it was handled, whether you had any criticism of the administration's actions and specifically of Mr. Fleming's. LL: It's very easy to criticize with hindsight. And I suspect that Bob Fleming would also criticize the actions since he had to take action under fire and without much chance to have reflection or to make referrals to a faculty committee. And, of course, he did decide to take action personally. If I were to criticize now about it, I think the major mistake was for Bob Fleming, then the provost of the Madison Campus, the assignment now we call chancellor. I guess he was called chancellor then. DT: I think so. LL: I think he'd been -- DT: It meant a little something different. LL: Yes, I think he'd been called chancellor. We'd changed the title from provost to chancellor, a small matter. But he did work with just a select, small group of angry violent protestors. And certainly, they were not elected. They were not the chosen by the whole campus. At that time, we had at least, mm, 22,000 to 25,000 students on the Madison Campus. And these people didn't represent student government. They didn't represent any major group on the basis of emotion or an action or a ballot of any kind, even a popular opinion poll. They simply took all of this onto themselves and invaded the chancellor's office. They threw papers around. They made demands of him. And the chancellor responded to them. They had their leaders, Mr. Cohen, and others, and he had debates with Mr. Cohen. And the chancellor would come out to the press and give his report. And then Mr. Cohen would come out and give his report. And Mr. Cohen and his group, allowing the chancellor to come into his own office when they were good and ready to have him come in. I think the, the mistake then [words unclear] a recognition of, of a major amount to these protestors and actually to consider that they spoke for the whole student body, which they did not. Now how he could've handled them without [words unclear] or aggressiveness to the fact that they were right on his doorstep [words unclear] maneuvers. But he did have serious discussions with them, he responded to their confrontations, and I just have a feeling that if he were here with us today, to be in this conversation, he would agree that it was unwise in retrospect to treat this group of belligerents, who broke in and broke all of the, the normal lines of conduct, as if they were the total campus [words unclear]. I think another mistake at that time was not to have brought in the recognized student government deliberately. Now he did some. He communicated with the president of the student government. But I think, again, in retrospect, this would've been the time to have called in the established student senators, who were elected, and their president, who represented the leadership and talk to them. And perhaps arrange for discussion too with the leadership of the faculty, so that there would be the chosen elected representation of faculty and students together, with administration, and then that group, that were reliable or responsible and were chosen in the proper fashion give attention to this very serious matter. And then report in and orderly fashion to this group what the decision was of those who were elected by the total faculty-student community. For going around this whole group brought about, or going around the elected students, going around the elected faculty, as he did, brought considerable confusion about who was in charge. Who was responsible? And so Mr. Cohen, the belligerent, who broke into the office, spoke to the press, to the nation, as if he really were the total student body and a good share of the faculty. And it was a matter of Cohen versus Fleming. Furthermore, Mr. Kauffman, Dean Kauffman, the dean of students, an able man here on the campus now, and a very sensitive fellow, Bob Fleming was also very sensitive, very really close to the pulse of the students. They were unhappy about the Vietnam War. They were unhappy about the way we got into the war. They -- LL: . . . for the attitudes, for the persuasions, for the commitments, for the general attitudes of faculty and students. And if they had communicated with them, they would've had had a very warm response. As it was, in spite of all of the confusion, I think that Dean Kauffman and Chancellor Fleming did have the respect of the faculty and total student body and generally went along. But the fact that they didn't go that channel, brought difficulties not only for 1965-66, but much of the problem of 1967, I feel, came when they, from having broken those lines of communication and from broken that steady response that comes from the orderly elected student and faculty groups. DT: Certainly, there was a lot of confusion, and your mention of the faculty, there were faculty teach-ins and things. LL: Oh, yes, there's no doubt. The faculty, whether it was a majority or not, it would be hard to say. But certainly a major segment of the faculty wanted to protest our part in Vietnam. They wanted to protest the Dow Chemical business of the napalm. They wanted to protest the right of the Dow Chemical people to come here to recruit. They were expressing their, let's say, disgust actually with the Vietnam situation by being a part of the sit-in, so students could listen, could participate, and there could be that rapport of student-faculty [word unclear] working together to try to find some answer to this quandary that we were in. So this was a chance, it seemed to me, to capitalize on the structure that was there rather than to ignore it. Go around and talk to the, to the small group of belligerents, 50, 60, or 70, even couple hundred, which is less than 1% of the whole student body and communicate with them as if they were in charge, if they were really running it. DT: Well, uh, whether that was responsible or not, we do know that the situation got a lot worse before it got better. LL: Yes, so, of course, it's again, I have to say how easy it is to sit here years later and in the calm that we now have, and look back and say, this is the way it ought to be done [words unclear] that it's, the action was absolutely [words unclear] but to catch the heat or to react to the heat of that confrontation was just the way it should've been done. Perhaps with Bob Fleming and Dean Kauffman, right in the center of things, maybe we had a degree of support [words unclear] we might never have had if he had chosen to dodge it and not meet with them, but gone about. It could be that if we shake it all down and let him speak for it too, and let Kauffman speak for it, maybe the fact that they met the situation head on by a confrontation and by having some communication with these belligerents, maybe they got a respect and a rapport with the faculty and with the students and the state that they might otherwise not have had. You can't deny that there's some recognition of courage and poise and sense of command when any top administrator will allow himself to walk right into what is known to be a red-hot situation and not duck it. DT: That's very true. However, things didn't really quite down, and Fleming left. LL: No, they didn't. DT: Do you think that this had, situation, this whole situation had something to do with his leaving? LL: I think so. I feel too that with Bob Fleming, who had charisma and the poise and internal strength to face a mob, to face belligerents, uh, with some degree of success, made it very difficult for a man such as Bill Sewell, who succeeded him, who did not have that kind of skill or that kind of desire to meet with people under those conditions. Uh, Bill Sewell was a fine scholar, indeed a gentleman, and highly regarded by the faculty, a man of considerable stature in his field, but one who had never been in the negotiating of what labor, such as Bob Fleming or one who had not had the kind of attributes to deal with in a mob situation. So he moved in then, following Bob Fleming, and immediately this, the confrontations came. But he was unprepared for it. This was, this was not his strength, this was not his interest, and he was caught not only unprepared, but he was caught without the tools to do the job. DT: Well -- LL: I'm not sure, but this confrontation in October, 1967, when we had tear gas and had to, had police damaged and students slugged, might have happened with Bob Fleming too. But I doubt it. I think had he stayed here, and he was learning all the time, he was getting more and more experience, learning how to work with police, learning how to work with the sheriffs, learning how to anticipate what the revolters, the revolutionary force would do. I think he could have prevented that kind of a major setback for all of us, that is, the head cracking and the tear-gassing of 1967. DT: Well, that, that year, or '67-'68, I guess it was, when Sewell was chancellor, was a pretty stormy year, and, of course, Sewell -- LL: All over the United States. DT: Yeah, everywhere, yes. LL: Not only here. We have to be fair about that. The Berkeley Campus, Chicago Campus, Harvard, Columbia, especially. DT: I'm wondering, given the climate at the time, why and with, as you said, Sewell's lack of, of experience with this type of situation -- LL: Yes. DT: -- why he was appointed chancellor to, to succeed Fleming. LL: Well, that's, that's a major question that involves many things other than student matters. I don't know exactly why he was chosen. I'm not sure Bill Sewell today knows exactly why he was chosen. But there were many people being considered as successors to Bob Fleming, and there was every wish on the part of Fred Harrington, as far as I know, then the president, to recommend a man to the regents who had undoubted support of the faculty. Harrington recognized the need for faculty support. And Sewell was highly regarded by the faculty, was, had been on the University Committee, and I believe he'd been chairman of the University Committee. So here's a man, a researcher, a teacher of international recognition, a personable man, a warmhearted, highly regarded in every respect with fine personal attributes, and it would seem then that he could be the spokesman for the faculty. And now we would have a chancellor on the campus, who would have not only understanding of the faculty, but strong support of the faculty in light of the difficulties which we knew might come. I think that was it. But Bill will have to speak, Fred Harrington will have to speak, and probably a couple who were on the board of regents, on the personnel committee. I can only make an estimate of it from the outside. DT: Yeah, that's what I was hoping you would do. LL: Yes. DT: Well, it certainly was unique situation. You know, he -- LL: Uh-huh, it really seemed like a good idea. You know, as you look back on it, I can understand that, that part of it to get a man of the faculty. DT: Well, as we know, it was, Bill Sewell was not happy, and he, he chose not to remain as chancellor. LL: Yes, just one year later, I believe it was in June or July of 19 -- DT: '68 maybe? LL: '68, that he very suddenly resigned, and his resignation was accepted. There was real strain there between the president of the university, Fred Harrington, and Bill Sewell. DT: That developed during that year? LL: That developed, well, right in those last weeks. Now what the cause was, I don't know. Here again, I guess we'll have to get the people who were right close. I didn't realize, as a member of the president's staff, that there was this tension. DT: You didn't? LL: No, no, I was not aware of it. Oh, I knew that the president of the University wanted a man as chancellor to manage things, to control things, and to keep them in hand and to be skillful enough to avoid major confrontations and to get faculty support, community support, statewide support, and even student support and really get things in perspective and get a handle on it. And yet, these problems kept coming, and, of course, the October matter was paramount. But I was not aware that there were these clear tensions to the point where the chancellor would walk in and tender his resignation, and he was maybe surprised, I don't know, to find that it was accepted right there and then, and that he was asked when he wanted to leave. And he said, right now. And I think he did. I think he just walked out the very next day, which was, usually there's a termination period of a month or so, or sometimes even a year. But this was very abrupt. DT: Well, my memory at the time was that it came as a surprise to the University as a whole. LL: Yes. DT: The suddenness of it. LL: I was driving to a meeting in northern Wisconsin when I heard it on the radio, and I was dumbfounded. If some of the stuff, there was an argument, I could have understood that. But that he resigned and the resignation immediately accepted, that was, to me, unconscionable. DT: Well, maybe we can find out more about that some day. LL: Yes. I'm sure you will. That's a very important part of University history, what happened there. DT: Well, I'll work on it. LL: Uh-huh. DT: [Inaudible speaking] just a minute to, to something you said awhile back about the changes of regulations in regard to student housing and so forth. LL: There were many. DT: You had something that you were telling me about. LL: Indeed. One which certainly is clear in my mind has to do with the situation, which related to regulations concerning men living in housing units, where there were single women. That is, a man could live in a home where there was a husband and wife. Or he could live in a home where there was a male in charge. But he could not live in a home where there was a single woman without special permission. And to my attention then, came a, a man here from Australia studying for his doctorate, in fact he was a professor in Australia. And he asked for special consideration for he lived with, in a home, where there were two elderly women, both unmarried at the time. And as he stated it, he didn't see why he couldn't have this privilege as he said, really, you know, I have no inclination whatever in respect to these elderly women. He could, felt there would be no romantic interest whatever. I relayed this to the dean of men, Dean Zillman, who really was in charge of any of these major changes, that is he was chairman of the committee, the Student Appeals Committee, and Conduct Committee. And he protested my action because, he said, if you make this exception for this man to live with single women, then you've got to do it for others. And I tried to point out that this was indeed a most exceptional case, a man of midyears living with these two quite elderly women. In fact, he had to look out for them, and they were lucky to have him. DT: They were [words unclear]. LL: Yes, that lucky to have him to clean the walks and do other things around the house. But Dean Zillman again maintained that if you make that kind of an exception, then the next ones will get closer and closer, and soon you'll break the rule. Well, it did seem ridiculous to me, and it seemed that surely an exception ought to be made, and so it was left that if dean Zillman wanted to appeal over my head, uh, he should then see the president. It was not done. DT: He did not appeal? LL: He did not appeal. It ended there. But I must point out that in fairness to Dean Zillman, that there was a major block of faculty members, who would back him up in that kind of an interpretation because they felt that a rule was a rule, and we should not make exceptions. And while it may have seemed ridiculous to a lot of the faculty, to have this situation exist, nonetheless, there were actually hundreds of faculty members revealed in later test cases who would have said, Dean Zillman did the right thing, for the record. DT: But the gentleman from Australia could stay? LL: Yes. All of this, of course, is highlighted by today, where we now have the regents just taking action last Friday, authorizing hard liquor to be served in residence halls. DT: Yes, I read about that. And I, there's criticism of this decision. LL: Oh, indeed, and so this, so now we have no hours for men, which we didn't have. We have no hours for women. We have men and women living in the same unit, although not on the same floor. We have authorization to serve beer. And now, we have authorization to serve hard liquor. So it's a long, long way in a very few years. DT: How do you feel about this, this recent decision about the liquor? LL: I'm opposed. I think that, uh, the one who wants to have hard liquor can go out and get it. There are places. DT: Well, now, particularly that the age has been lowered to -- LL: Yes. DT: -- 18. LL: To 18, they can go out and get it. I'm, I have particularly in mind the young man or woman who really doesn't want to be around it. There are boys and girls, who at 18 and 19, are still very young. And they have had a home situation which really wouldn't prepare them for being around those that consume liquor, who can show off or who can be tired or can, who have just plain bad habits and bad manners. And suddenly, they're confronted with not necessarily drunkenness, but with, um, excessive consumption. And the results of it can be embarrassing and annoying and really quite disturbing to the student who doesn't want to be around that kind of thing, and really isn't ready for it. If that 17- or 18-year-old or 19-year-old was four or five years older or traveled or been in military service and then came back, that student could take it in stride. But I think some people, I'm sure of this. We know this is true, 18-year-olds can be quite boys and girls rather than young men and women quite at that time. There are differences in maturity, considerable differences. And in light of that, I think it puts quite a strain on the student that doesn't want to be around hard liquor, isn't ready for it, and, uh, now faces it. So I would've voted against it. I would've voted for opening the housing regulations. I did that. I think that's another matter. Um, that has its problems too. And I think beer is a little different. Oh, one can get high on beer to be sure, but they have to drink much more of it, and it doesn't have the immediate effect of three or four ounces of hard liquor. That's my opinion. I would've been voted down. DT: Yes, they passed it. So we'll see what now comes of it. LL: Said off the record, I think that, uh, the administration was very worried about this, and I don't think they've heard the last of it. I think we're going to get repercussions from this. But you even have the situation in Platteville, where [Bijorne Elsvick?], the chancellor not many years ago, in fact, I think not over seven years ago, felt that he was going all out to allow beer to be sold at the Student Union. And now here he was just these few years later being one of those that spoke in favor of having hard liquor served or available in the dormitories. DT: That's an interesting change of view. LL: It is, yes. DT: Well, it will be interesting to see what now comes of all this, watch what uh develops. LL: Um-hmm, and I can be quite wrong. I can be quite wrong. But that would be my opinion as of now. DT: Well, that's what I asked you. LL: Yep. DT: Now, perhaps, there are a number of other things about your, your days as dean of students that I'd be interested in. But since we've started talking about, uh, the whole protest movement, so to speak, maybe we might as well go on with that and then return later to, to some of these other questions. LL: Yeah. DT: We did talk about the Dow recruiting incident and something with the sit-ins -- LL: Dow Chemical. DT: Dow Chemical and something about the sit-ins, a little bit about the teach-ins. Of course, the situation didn't get better for a while. It got worse. And Fleming did, in fact, resign as you described. And I guess you might say that in a way it kind of all culminated in the bombing at Sterling Hall. LL: One could say that. DT: Or do you feel that way? I know this wasn't the end of it. There were protests continued, but -- LL: No, no, it was not the end. The protests did continue, but not in the fashion that they did prior to August of 1970 then the bombing of Sterling Hall. It would have to be my opinion and the reflection that all of these protests did finally culminate in something which had to be very, very serious. You could feel it coming, that something would occur, which could cause the loss of life or the loss of major property. And surely, that happened in the bombing of Sterling Hall. The protests, the opposition to our participation in Vietnam, and the fact that many faculty members engaged in protests, the fact that it seemed to be a way of life, it seemed to be the thing to do, probably gave these young men, who did the bombing, a feeling that they were doing something that was right. They were helping, they felt, to stop a war. And they were helping to stop it by some major vigorous, in their thinking, clever and courageous act. Now we know that a life was lost, massive property loss. We are lucky to come out of it as well as we did. DT: Could have been more. LL: There could've been 25 or 30 people killed. There could have been $20 million of property destroyed. There could've been research work lost that had taken centuries almost to build up. But that did not occur. Certainly, one life is too much to lose and one building is too much to lose, although, I don't compare them. The life is a thing that must concern us most, naturally. If there had not been the protests on this campus, if there had not been that kind of climate, I doubt if these young men would've taken it on themselves to dynamite a structure. So you can say that it's an accumulation of attitude, of confidence in their act, of justification in their act, and maybe even a feeling, as they said later, of righteousness that they were doing the thing that America had to get done, and that they were doing something in which they really acted for, the spoke for, the major segment of the student body. Well, after all, The Daily Cardinal, for whatever that's worth, did defend their act. And many in student government defended their act. Significantly, very few faculty spoke in favor of their act, very few. As I can recall now, I don't remember a single one who identified himself or herself as justifying this action. Now there may have been a few. I'm a bit hazy on that. But I can't recall any leading faculty member who stood up to say, it's too bad, we lost a life, but these boys did the right thing. DT: How do you explain this, generation gap or something else? LL: Well, after all, the faculty could see here the invasion of their own work. Here was one of their own structures gone. Here was one of their own students gone. And I suspect too that they recognize that this could mean the closing down of the University, not that they're thinking necessarily of their bread and butter, but I think they could see now in this dramatic fashion, this act, that there could be the closing down of the whole university or the student part of it. In fact, that war proposed, you know, that in light of this, who knows how many other bombs there will be? We better close down now before other lives are lost. And it is my belief that many of the faculty then began to talk about it, and those that didn't talk about it, began to understand just how serious this was and how serious it was to them personally. Now it really came home. So they took no part in it, and further, I think that since this was a, an act of destroying some federal equipment and state equipment, that they did not want to get on record as in any way being in favor of this, so that they would be brought into hearings or brought into court. After all, faculty do have more perspective. They ought to have. And I think that made a difference. At any rate, there was no major faculty action of any kind as there was in the Dow Chemical before, and as there was in other incidences of protest. Here, there was none. DT: Well, part of the problem there, of course, had to do with the fact, isn't it true, that the Army Math was located at that time -- LL: Yes. DT: -- in Sterling Hall? LL: Uh-huh. Yes. DT: And subsequently, they've been, they have moved their headquarters out to the -- LL: That's right -- DT: -- WARF Building. LL: [Word unclear] Research Building, uh-huh. DT: What do you know of the administration and/or regent reaction to this, and why did they, did -- LL: You mean the bombing? DT: Well, to the bombing and to the business, whether to, what to do about the Army Math Center, which was its sort of focus. LL: Immediately after the bombing, the regents did come in with the president of the regents, Bernie Ziegler, arrived the next morning, was here to survey it with Chancellor Ed Young. And it, and Bernie Ziegler made the statement immediately that it was, while it was destructive, and it was shocking, it was tragic, that the University work would have to go on. And that was the feeling of the regents, that with all of the trauma and all of the disaster, the University work would continue. And that was, of course, exemplified by the University hospitals, where the work went on the very next day, operations were made, and the nurses came on duty, the doctors came on duty, and the research work continued while there was still smoke and rubble. The hospitals continued their work. I think that was indicative of the attitude of the whole campus. And the regents spoke in the, properly in glowing terms about that kind of dedication and that kind of poise and courage on the part of the staff. Following up the regents too felt that it would be, well, I guess I can't speak precisely why they moved to WARF. DT: Well, I wondered if it wasn't a sort of reaction to this, or whether there had been a plan all along for this kind of move. LL: I'm not sure, but I, I suspect that they thought was right along to go out to WARF and as a possibility, and certainly, it took the pressure off. Rather than to go right down in the very center, where Sterling Hall is, and the heart of the campus, it took the pressure off from what could be an attention on the part of the student protestors to put it out in WARF, which is a half a mile or so away. I think it was a good decision. Precisely why they did it, I do not know. But I think it was a good decision to go up to WARF. DT: Well, again, in hindsight, at least, things are calmed down in relation to this particular activity. LL: Yes. DT: And they did even while protests were still going on on the campus, to my memory. LL: Um-hmm, oh, yes. Alumni research foundation worked with the Math Center, and the Math Center went right along. There was no real break except for equipment loss. And as I remember too, they didn't get all of the Army Math Center equipment. They damaged some, but they really didn't destroy it. DT: Well, there were other things located in Sterling Hall. LL: Yes. DT: And I guess there was damage to a lot of the Physics -- LL: Oh, yes, over $1 million in destruction, some said $1.5 million. Yes, there was work in Physics that was destroyed. By the way, I said that there was, it would have been, it could have been very damaging to have had a lot of research work destroyed. There was research work destroyed in this bombing as I remember now. How much, I can't say, but there were valuable papers lost. DT: Well, um, just going back to your statement that, that the, you felt that the individuals involved in this had felt that they had a kind of mandate of sorts -- LL: Yes. DT: That they were protesting. LL: Um-hmm, that's what they said. DT: It is true, is it not, at least my impression was that from the trial of Carleton Armstrong, the only one who has been tried so far -- LL: Yes, mm-hmm. DT: That they tried to, tried to show that it was a political issue. LL: Yes. DT: And I guess they didn't succeed in proving this. LL: No, they didn't. DT: But this was the effort. LL: They had lawyers. In fact, I think even former Senator [Gruene or Greene?], whatever pronunciation is from Alaska, an elderly man came all the way to Madison to indicate that he thought it was a political issue, therefore, it would have to be considered as such. And, of course, they had some strong attorneys making that point. Again, I don't believe there was a single University faculty member who came down to make that statement. And that's significant. They were noticeably quiet. DT: Well, to go on, there were incidents after that. There were still some protests. LL: Yes. DT: But considerable amount of steam, I guess, was removed when, when the -- LL: Even the numbers, the numbers got much less. In 1971, there was a protest, but rather than have 4,000 and 5,000 and 6,000 students out and townspeople, there were only about a couple hundred. And they marched to the capitol, but it was on the sidewalks and quite peaceful. The real power, the force of the protests now was diminished markedly. DT: But they still had the National Guard out in force, and I recall seeing all sorts of vehicles. LL: After 1970? DT: After, yes, as late as I would say the spring of '71. LL: They certainly had them out in 1968 and '69, there were National Guard out. DT: But even, I think it was -- LL: The spring. DT: -- the spring of '71. LL: The spring, the spring of '70 was major. That's when we had the teaching assistant, TA strike, and that's when they had the Kent State problem and the one in the South, and then the National Guard was out and we had a major problem on the campus. It was really very tense, tear gas, and at night, it seemed almost like combat with helicopters overhead, at least one helicopter, and major searchlights used from the helicopter. So that was the spring of 1970. May I go back in my records to see how much the National Guard was called out after 1970, August? DT: Well, I seem to recall -- LL: It could well be. DT: In the spring, at least of '71, looking out the library windows and watching from the Archives office, the vehicles, the various sorts and tear gas. But I sort of feel this was perhaps about the end of it. Um, I would be interested in knowing, people have commented about the sudden, what they describe as a sudden shift -- LL: Yes. DT: -- in student reaction. Clearly the cessation of our involvement in Vietnam had a lot to do with it. Do you think anything else is having anything to do with it, the sudden change in student attitude? LL: [Word unclear] oh, certainly, doing away with the draft, this took away a lot of the tensions and pressures because students who were on a campus did not need to feel guilty, which I'm sure many of them did, that there were young people who couldn't be admitted to college or didn't, didn't choose to be at a college were serving in at military and in Vietnam, while those that were in college were freed of that responsibility. That made a difference, doing away with the draft. I think another major reason was that the students began to see that these protest leaders were really using them, that the protest leaders wanted to do the kind of destruction or the kind of breakdown of society or education in their own fashion, and that these leaders needed to have the backing of a main body of students. And then that these leaders would lead the students, 1,000 or more, in a protest. And then when the police came, the leaders would disappear, and the students who were there following, sincerely, would be picked up and would be embarrassed or harassed. And the students began to get onto that, that they were used, that the leaders manipulated them. And when they understood that, that these fellows that would get up to the microphones and, and do all the haranguing and all of the writing were somehow always disappearing when the police came, and that these folks, who were sincere about it and followed were the ones that paid the penalty. That got to be pretty old stuff and soon there became that reaction against them. I think that was a major factor. Plus still another, I think it was just getting tired of it. It became a wearisome thing, that had been going on and on, and students began to worry now too about getting jobs, getting placements, and the fact that many were being apprehended and fined and police records are not a good thing to have. So that was related to the difficulty in getting jobs. That's another factor. We've got two or three here, all going along. The need to have a good record to apply for a job, and jobs were not as plentiful. So this steadied things down, and this made them more conservative. Perhaps we should say more cautious. Still another factor was that the high school kids began to pick up the protest business, and traditionally, when high school youngsters pick up and act, that a college students have done, the college students then begin to lose interest in it. DT: That's interesting point, I hadn't thought of that. LL: Oh, yes, yes, this, this makes it juvenile rather than major, an adult. So those would be the several observations I would make. DT: This is not exactly on the same subject, but it's perhaps related. It was the same kind of activity. I was thinking of the Mifflin Street protests, the block party that went awry as it was denied permission and all the confrontation of the city police. Do you feel this sort of was related to all this other tension? LL: Oh, yes. Many, quite a few of the leaders who were involved in the campus protest would also show up and Mifflin Street. I say quite a few, not all because a lot of these leaders that were on the Vietnam, the Dow Chemical, and all, were many from out of the state of Wisconsin. They were not University of Wisconsin students. DT: Is this true? I've heard it rumored, but I was never sure. LL: Oh, yes, no doubt about it, they came and then disappeared or went on to Columbia or wherever they were going. In fact, quite a, some of them had a route from Berkeley to Madison to Ann Arbor and then to Columbia and possibly up to Harvard or Yale or Princeton. That was the route across the country, and some stopping off in Chicago. So I think that, that did make a difference. These people who were, who were the pro, the professionals, so called, who dropped out. Let's see, you had another question along with that. DT: Uh, well, I wondered if, basically, whether it was related to the [word unclear]. LL: Oh, to Mifflin Street, you were saying. DT: Yeah, the Mifflin Street thing. LL: In part, it was part of the climate of protesting the establishment, and when you protest the establishment of the federal government or state government. When you go to Mifflin Street and protest the city government, that again is a part of the establishment. There also was the excitement, and I, again, I am sure, that it was just the fun of getting the police out. That is now we didn't have the National Guard or the police on the campus for these protests, but there was some fun in having the kind of an action which would bring the police in and put them in a very undesirable situation, where the students could disappear up into the Mifflin Street apartments and Mifflin Street houses and the police would be left there to be heckled and harassed. There was fun in that. Much of that was fun and games, and, of course, liked fun and games, with big crowds. Once the sirens wail, and once the clubs come out, many people get hurt when they didn't expect to get hurt and didn't want to get hurt and protested that they had nothing to do with it. But they were just part of the crowd, nothing new about it. It's as old as can be. You're part of a crowd, you take a chance, and that was woven into it, these people that were part of the crowd and took their chances. So there was no direct line of, as I observed, of the pro, the Vietnam federal government protests and Department of Defense protests and military on the campus through to Mifflin Street except that there was an attitude, a climate of opposing the establishment. DT: Well, in line with what you just said about fun and games, I do seem to remember reading a year or two later when a similar type of block party with a new mayor was approved and was held, that there were statements in the paper by some people saying the fun had all gone out of it. LL: Yeah, yes. Yeah, and also when the chief of police, the new chief of police entered in the parade, there was a peace parade carrying candles from the field house to the capitol square, and our new chief of police, Mr. Cooper, rather than feel that there had to be firm action taken to stop it or control it, was there in civilian clothes and carried a candle and walked with them -- DT: I didn't know that. LL: -- which again, took, that took a lot of steam out of it. Now his colleagues, at least some of his colleagues protested that. But we'll see nonetheless there was no difficulty, and he was there. And Alderman Soglin was there. DT: Our now mayor. LL: Now our mayor,